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I. INTRODUCTION

Fetal tissue transplantation offers hope for a cure to hundreds of thousands
of people suffering from a number of debilitating diseases. Due to its proximity
to the turbulent domain of abortion politics, fetal tissue research provokes
intense social conflict, and participates in the controversial moral and political
concerns that surround the abortion debate.
At the heart of both debates lies the question of fetal worth. Researchers have
managed to avoid the question by distinguishing between the decision to abort
and the decision to donate the resultant fetal tissue. For example, current
federal regulations require that the decision to donate be made only after a

1
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woman has decided to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. 2 These researchers
believe that by keeping the two decisions temporally separate, the desire to
possibly help a person in need of fetal tissue therapy will not affect a woman's
decision to abort. 3 The acceptance of such regulations, the researchers believe,
assures that "[a] practical separation of induced abortion and the subsequent
4
use of human fetal tissue for the purposes of public policy" has been achieved.
I shall argue that the issue of fetal tissue transplantation cannot be insulated
from the issue of abortion; ignoring this connection risks devaluation of both
women and the fetuses they carry.5 While some would argue that a limitation
on donative choice will lead to further limitations on a woman's reproductive
autonomy, 6 a restriction on donative choice need not be a restriction on abortive
242 U.S.C. § 289 et seq. (1996), in pertinent part:
(b) INFORMED CONSENT OF DONOR.(2) ADDMONAL STATEMENT. - In research carried out under
subsection (a) human fetal tissue may be used only if the attending
physician with respect to obtaining the tissue from the woman involved makes a statement, made in writing and signed by the
physician, declaring that:
(A) in the case of tissue obtained pursuant to an induced abortion (i) the consent of the woman for the abortion was obtained prior to
requesting or obtaining consent for a donation of the tissue for use
in such research;
(ii) no alteration of the timing, method, or procedures used to
terminate the pregnancy was made solely for the purposes of
obtaining the tissue; and
(iii) the abortion was performed in accordance with applicable State
law;
(B) the tissue has been donated by the woman in accordance with
paragraph (1); and
(C) full disclosure has been provided to the woman with regard to (i) such physician's interest, if any, in the research to be conducted
with the tissue; and
(ii) any known medical risks to the woman or risks to her privacy
that might be associated with the donation of the tissue and that are
in addition to risks of such type that are associated with the woman's
medical care.
3

Carson Strong, Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Can it be Morally Insulated From
Abortion? 17J. MED. Eri-ics 70-6 (1991).
4

Robert M. Nelson, A Policy Concerning the Therapeutic Use of Human Fetal Tissue in
Transplantation,152 W.J. MED., 447-48 (1990).
5

An additional way in which fetal tissue researchers may devalue human life is to
define the fetus as a tool, or an intervention. By constructing the fetus as a "therapeutic
technology" with the potential to benefit many "living"people, scientists conceive of the
fetus as "devoid of human social attributes such as personhood and agency." Monica J.
Casper, At the Margins of Humanity: FetalPositionsin Scienceand Medicine, 19 Sci., TECH.,
& HUMAN VALUES, 307,317 (1994). Defining the fetus as non-human devalues the fetus,
and provides fodder for anti-abortion activists who find justification for their position
if doctors would treat the fetus as anything less than human.
6
See James E. Goddard, Note, The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 Washed Away Many
Legal Problems With Fetal Tissue TransplantationResearch But A Stain Remains, 49 S.M.U.

1995-961

FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION

choice; the circumstances that give rise to each choice are entirely different. The
moral exception that permits an abortion in the case of an accidental pregnancy
should not extend to the case of intentionally becoming pregnant in order to
"make tissue." Conflating the two variant moral situations and thereby treating
the limited restriction on donative choice as a blanket restriction on abortive
rights would do more to jeopardize a woman's reproductive autonomy than
would acknowledging and enforcing the morally necessary distinction.
This study addresses the issue of a woman's right to donate fetal tissue to
the designee of her choice, following either an unwanted or an intended
pregnancy. A key question is whether the right to abort prior to fetal viability
(currently protected as a matter of federal constitutional law)7 also affords a
woman the right to donate the aborted fetal tissue to the recipient of her choice,
or, further, to become pregnant with the intent to abort in order to donate the
fetal tissue. I use casuistic reasoning to argue for a justification of both abortion
and fetal tissue transplantation, and to argue against directed donation,
analogizing the key issues to the ethical framework of just-war and self-defense
8
reasoning.
L. REV. 375, (1996) (arguing that the restriction on directed donation infringes on a
woman's fundamental right to have an abortion, because Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) allow a women
to have an abortion for any reason). Clearly, however, the issue of becoming pregnant
with the intent to abort was not before the court in these cases.
7
8

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.

Casuistry is the deliberative process of drawing analogies between the new and
the familiar, the accepted and the ambiguous, in order to solve newly presented ethical
dilemmas. It should be noted that I argue from a strictly moral standpoint. I do not
address the ideology of those who believe, for religious or other reasons, that abortion
is "wrong for any reason, even to save the life of the mother." Keith J.Allred, Fetal Tissue
Transplants: A PrinterWith a Look Forward,28J. HEALTH & HOsp. L. 193 (1995). Rather, I
will attempt to show that a moral justification for abortion does not necessarily derive
from a lack of respect for the suffering of others.
The uncertainty of the conflict between fetal tissue transplantation and certain
religious convictions is illustrated by Keith J.Allred in his paper Fetal Tissue Transplants:
A PrimerWith a Look Forward.Id. Allred discusses the case of Terri and Guy Walden, a
Southern Baptist couple who at one time "did not approve of abortions under any
circumstances."Id. The couple had two children afflicted with Hurler's syndrome, a rare
and deadly genetic disease. Id. One child had already died and the other's health was
failing when Terri learned that she was once again pregnant. Allred, supranote 8, at 193.
Tests showed that the fetus was also afflicted with Hurler's syndrome. Id. Shortly
thereafter, the Waldens learned of a new technique"involving the transplantation of the
liver cells from an aborted fetus into an unborn" fetus with Hurler's syndrome. Id.
Although the procedure was in the experimental stage, "researchers hoped the
transplanted cells would [migrate] to the recipient's bone marrow and produce" the
crucial missing enzyme. Id. The Waldens, torn between their strong religious opposition
to abortion and their desire to save their newborn child, finally justified the operation
based on the scriptural account of God having "removed one of Adam's ribs to create
Eve." Allred, supra note 8, at 193.
The procedure was performed on the fetus in utero, but when the child was born,
he showed no sign of developing the crucial enzyme. Id. After six months, however,
tests revealed that he was producing "low normal amounts" of the missing enzyme, and
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I propose that a woman who becomes pregnant with the intent to abort will
be treated as an initial aggressor, and as such she will be denied the "abortion
exception" that will be granted to the woman who aborts an accidental,
unwanted pregnancy. Moreover, I shall argue that a woman should not be
allowed to designate the donee of the fetal tissue from her abortion, even
though her pregnancy was accidental. Without this restriction, a woman who
intends to become pregnant and abort may simply claim her pregnancy was
accidental, and thereby claim the exception.
Central to this study is the question of fetal worth, and the value to be
ascribed to beings not like us, that is, not like human beings who have been
born. Although I argue for a moral justification of elective abortions, I intend
to show that such a justification should be a narrowly drawn exception to the
prima facie duties neither to harm nor to instrumentalize others. I shall also
argue that prohibiting a woman from becoming pregnant in order to abort is
necessary because such a situation does not fall within the narrow exception
for elective abortions, and that such a restriction is crucial to preserving our
respect for those with no voice. Finally, I shall argue that the prohibition against
becoming pregnant with the intent to abort does not vitiate a woman's right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Rather, this restriction is a necessary
condition of the prima facie duties of nonmaleficence and
non-instrumentalization.
A. Use of Fetal Tissue in the Treatment of Various Diseases
Fetal tissue transplantation therapy offers hope for victims of several
debilitating diseases including Parkinson's disease,9 Alzheimer's disease, 10
15
14
3
aplastic anemia,11 leukemia, 12 spinal cord injuryI thalassemia, AIDS,

that the transplant was a success. Id. The Waldens are now advocates of fetal tissue

transplantation, and believe that all those facing similar dilemmas should have the
option to use these techniques. Id. For a detailed description of this technique, see Esmail
Zanjani, Transplantationof Fetal Liver Hematopoeitic Stem Cells in Utero. Paper presented

atInstitute of Medicine Conference on Fetal Research and Applications, June 20-22,1986,

Irvine, CA.
9
Ignacio

Madrazo, et al., Fetal Homotransplants(Ventral Mesencephalon and Adrenal

Tissue) to Striatum of ParkinsonianSubjects, 47 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 1281 (1990); H.
Winder, et al., Bilateral Fetal Mesencephalic Grafting in Two Patients With Parkinsonism
Induced by I Methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,36-tetrahydropyridine(MPTP), 327 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1541 (1992); Curt R. Freed, et al., Survival of lmplantedFetal Dopamine Cells and Neurologic

Improvement 12 to 46 Months After Transplantationfor Parkinson'sDisease, 327 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1549 (1992).
1
ODavid R. Liskowsky, From the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, 265
JAMA 3225,3225 (1991).
11
Robert P. Gale, Fetal Liver Transplantation in Aplastic Anemia and Leukemia, 10

THYMUS 89 (1987).
12

Id.

13

Sally Squires, Spinal Cord Repair Research Yields Results, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1992,
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DiGeorge's Syndrome, 16 and diabetes. 17 In the treatment of neurologic
diseases, it is hoped that fresh fetal brain cells, when transplanted into the areas
of an adult brain having been damaged by various neurological diseases, will
regenerate in these areas, restoring normal function. Preliminary studies reveal
some success. 18 It is also hoped that transplantation of fetal pancreatic cells will
replace defective pancreatic cells in adults with diabetes. 19
Fetal cells are particularly well suited for transplantation because they are
immunologically immature and thus less likely to trigger an immune response
from the host20 This tissue is also biologically "plastic," adjusting readily to a
new physiological environment.21 Further, fetal tissues and organs are capable
22
of being preserved and then revived using the technique of cryopreservation.
B. Fetal Tissue as a Possible Curefor Diabetes
Scientists have begun working with undeveloped fetal pancreatic tissue in
an attempt to find a cure for diabetes. In type I diabetes, the insulin-producing
at Health 6.
14 Jean L. Touraine, et al., Fetal Tissue Transplantationand Prospective Gene Therapy in
Severe Immunodeficiencies and Enzyme Deficiencies, 10 THYMUS 75 (1987).
15 Racheal Benson Gold & Dorothy Lehrman, Fetal Research Under Fire,The Influence
ofAbortion Politics, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 6 (1989).
16C. S. August, et al., Implantation of a Foetal Thymus Restoring Immunological
Competence in a PatientWith Thymic Aplasia (DiGeorge'sSyndrome), 2 LANcET 1210 (1968).
17
Bernard E. Tuch, et al., Normalizationof Blood Glucose Levels in NondiabeticMale Mice
by Human Fetal PancreasAfter Induction of Diabetes, 46 TRANSPLANTATION 608 (1988);
Shauna S. Roberts, Potential Cure, Ethical Questions; UsingFetal Tissue Transplantationas
Therapyfor Insulin-DependentDiabetes, 48 DiABETES FORECAST 42 (August, 1995).
18
See, e.g., Fetal Cell Tissue Use Affects Parkinson's Disease, (CNN NEws, Transcript
#221-5, May 21, 1994): Close to twenty human transplants have been performed at the
University of Colorado, and "a dozen patients have had the cells at leasta year... [which
is] long enough ... to judge any benefits." Dr. Curt Freed reports that two-thirds of the
patients 'have shown some improvement," and six out of the twelve"have had a change
in their Parkinson's disease that has revolutionized their lives." In order to answer
challenges from skeptics who claim that the transplant patients improve due to a mere
placebo effect, Dr. Freed has agreed to perform a study which involves sham surgery.
In this study, one half of the patients will receive fetal cell tissues, while the other half
will not. Both sets of patients will have all of the same procedures, except that the
surgeons will not penetrate the control group's brains with needles, and no tissue will
be injected into the brain. Control subjects will have the chance to return for "a real fetal
tissue transplant" after a year has passed. Participants will be fully informed of the risks
of the surgery, and of the possibility that they might not receive any cells at all.
19
See Roberts, supra note 17.
20
Council on Scientific Affairs, Medical Applicationsof Fetal Tissue Transplantation,263
JAMA 565, 566 (1990).
21

1d. at 566.

22

See Casper, supra note 5.
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beta cells, located in the islets of the pancreas, are either damaged or destroyed.
Although no cure exists, people "manage" the disease by self-administering
daily injections of insulin. Despite even the most careful regimen, however,
diabetes can still rage out of control, leading to serious complications or
death.23 Researchers believe that providing diabetics with new,
insulin-producing tissue might ultimately cure their diabetes. 24
Organs such as the pancreas are formed from "unspecialized, nonfunctional
cells" that eventually "proliferate (multiply) and differentiate (become
specialize)," resulting in the mature, functioning organ.25 The hope is that
transplanting the undifferentiated fetal pancreatic islet cells will provide the
host with potential insulin-producing, young, and healthy cells. 26 Fetal
pancreatic cells have the advantage of being genetically primed to grow quickly
and abundantly, whereas adult cells are programmed "simply to maintain the
status quo." 27 Also, fetal pancreatic cells are susceptible to replication through
growth hormone, while adult cells tend to resist such
stimulation by
28
manipulation.
Fetal islet transplants in humans have been performed in other countries,
and scientists in the United States have been experimenting with these
unspecialized cells both in vitro and in animals. 29 One scientist has developed
23
"Despite the present inadequacy of subcutaneous insulin delivery systems for
physiological insulin replacement, over 60% of patients with Type I diabetes do
reasonably well over the long term. The remaining develop severe disability leading to
blindness, end stage renal failure, and early demise." John H. Karam, Diabetes Mellitus
and Hypoglycemia, in, CURRENT MED. DIAGNosIS & TREATMENT 1029 (L. Tierney, Jr. et al.,
eds. 1995). The implication of this statement is that a superior insulin delivery system
would avert an early demise. Perhaps fetal pancreatic tissue will one day serve as that
"superior insulin delivery system." Id. at 1029.
24
Transplants of adult pancreases into diabetic patients have produced
disappointing results. The surgery is complicated, and the "transplant recipients must
take [immunosuppressant] drugs for the rest of their lives" in order to avoid rejecting
the new organ. The side effects from these drugs are so severe that a "pancreas transplant
isn'tdone unless thepatient already takes immunosuppressants" required bya previous
organ transplant, or is at a high risk for diabetes-induced death. Roberts, supranote 17,
at 42.
25
1d.
26

0ne researcher has transplanted a combination of adult and fetal pig isletcells into
diabetic pigs. This type of transplant is thought to yield a "faster-acting, longer-lasting
transplant" because it combines the advantages of both therapies: the adult cells begin
producing insulin immediately, while the fetal cells require time to differentiate before
they can produce insulin. Also, the adult cells wear out quickly whereas the fetal cells
have a lifetime of insulin production ahead of them. Finally, the immediate glucose
control afforded by the adult cells is thought to "improve[] the environment for the
growth and maturation of the fetal islets." Id.
27

1d.

28

Roberts, supra note 17, at 43.
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an "immortal" cell line of fetal tissue pancreas cells, producing pancreas cells
that can grow outside the body indefinitely, provided they are cultured
correctly.30 While such cell lines may some day obviate the need for fetal tissue,
these cell lines cannot be developed without first using actual fetal cells.
Extraction of fetal tissue is a difficult and complex process. 31 Fetal brain cells
are living organisms and must be frozen within minutes of leaving the mother's
body or they will become useless for transplantation purposes. 32 After either
spontaneous or induced abortion, researchers must quickly transport the fetal
remnants to neurosurgeons or neuro-anatomists who search through the
remains for brain tissue. 33 Once the desired tissue is found, the researchers
immediately freeze the cells to preserve them for future use.34 All of this must
occur within minutes of removal of the fetus from the woman's body, and
requires the presence of specialists able to identify the appropriate tissue from
the fetal remains. 35 Thus, the collection procedure can be accomplished only
in a hospital setting and only where there are specialists available to locate and
harvest the appropriate tissue immediately.
Researchers maintain that they need at least several thousand fetuses each
year in order to conduct transplant research. 36 The fetal tissue available from
ectopic pregnancies and spontaneous abortions, however, is usually infected
37
or chromosomally defective, and cannot be used for transplant purposes.
Only elective abortions consistently yield healthy tissue, and the 1.6 million
abortions performed every year provide an abundant, potential source of fetal
tissue.38 Because elective abortions are the primary source of fetal tissue, the
30

d.

31 U.S. ProposalFails to Settle Fetal Issue; Some Scientists Say Ideafor Tissue Research Bank

is Unworkable, WASH. POST, May 21,1992, at A3. [hereinafter, U.S. Proposal].
32

Roberts, supra note 17, at 43.

33

Although the researchers collect the fetal remains in a sterile jar, approximately
"30% of the specimens are infected with bacteria," making them useless for
transplantation purposes. Id.
34

1d.

351d.
36
Daniel J. Carry, et al., Are There Really Alternatives to the Use of Fetal Tissue From
Elective Abortions in TransplantationResearch?, 327 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1592,1593 (1992).
37
38

Id.
Fetal tissue transplant research ... will use tissue retrieved from the one

and a half million abortions performed annually in the United States to
end unwanted pregnancies. Nearly 80 percent of induced abortions are
performed between the sixth and eleventh weeks of gestation, at which
time neural and other tissue is sufficiently developed to be retrieved and
transplanted.
John Robertson, Rights, Symbolism, and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue Transplants, 18
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1988), (citing, S. Henshaw, et al., A PortraitofAmerican Women

Who Obtain Abortions, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 90-96 (1985)).
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social concerns and controversies surrounding abortion have been extended to
the issue of fetal tissue transplantations. 39
The recent discovery of a safe and effective alternative to invasive methods
of pregnancy termination will likely decrease the amount of fetal tissue
available for transplants. The new treatment, which involves the combination
of two drugs already approved for other uses in the United States, can be
administered in the privacy of a doctor's office, with the completion of the
actual abortion occurring in the woman's home, five to seven days after
administration of the second drug. 40 Since the fetus is expelled in the woman's
home, it is impossible to harvest the cells under sterile conditions, and, by the
time the expulsion occurs, the tissue is nonviable and therefore no longer useful
for transplant purposes. 41 The introduction of these medical abortions will
decrease the availability of fetal tissue significantly, but until the drugs are
widely available, surgical abortions will continue to occur.

39

See, U.S. Proposal,supra note 31.

4ORichard U. Hausknecht, Methotrexate and Misoprostol to Terminate Early Pregnancy.
333 NEw ENG. J.MED., 537 (1995). The women seeking termination of their pregnancies
who were selected for participation in a pilot study of this abortion procedure, were
selected "on the basis of their good general health, emotional stability, and a pregnancy
of 63 days or less in duration." Id. The participants weregiven an intramuscular injection
of methotrexate, a drug which "has been used safely and successfully to terminate
unruptured ectopic pregnancy." Id. at 538. Seven days later, a dose of misoprostol, a
drugwhich causes uterine contractions, was administered intervaginally.Id. "If abortion
did not occur after seven days [following the administration of misoprostol] the woman
was offered [the option of receiving] a second dose of misoprostol, or vacuum
aspiration." Hausknecht, supranote 40, at 538. Out of 178 women who participated, 171
had successful non-surgical abortions. Id. Twenty-five of the women required a second
doseof misoprostol, and of these, seven required further treatment in the form of suction
curettage. Id. All seven surgical abortions revealed "histological evidence of disruption
of the conceptus." Id. There were "no important side effects or complications" noted;
indeed, when the women were asked to rate the experience with any previous abortions
they might have had, "they overwhelmingly preferred the medical termination of
pregnancy to the surgical method." Hausknecht, supra note 40, at 539. Although the
author concluded that "the combination of methotrexate and misoprostol represents a
safe and effective alternative to invasive methods for the termination of early
pregnancy," id., some experts advise women who might be inclined to try the procedure
to wait until further studies have been completed, or until the FDA has explicitly
approved the drugs. Harassment-FreeAbortions,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at A24.
Following the publication of Dr. Hausknecht's study, Dr. Eric Schaff published the
results of a similar study. The combination therapy resulted in non-surgical abortions
in 98 out of 100 abortion-seeking women, (some of whom were up to 8 weeks pregnant),
with the remaining two women requiring surgical abortions. Since completing the
study, Dr. Schaff has used the treatment on a total of 280 women, with a 97% success
rate. Additionally, researchers testing the abortion drug RU 486, will file a new drug
application with the FDA this year, following U.S.-based clinical trials of the drug.
Approval could occur in 1996. New Study Confirms Medical Abortion Safe, PROPRIETARY
TO THE UNITED PRESS INT'L 1995, Sept. 14,1995, Domestic News Section.
41

See, U.S. Proposal,supra note 31.
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II. POLITICAL HISTORY OF FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION

In her paper Regulating Transfer and Use of Fetal Tissue in Transplantation
Procedures: The Ethical Dimensions, Nikki Melina Constantine Bell provides an
excellent review of the procedural history of fetal tissue transplantation
research. 42 Prior to 1987, federal approval of fetal tissue transplantation
research was not necessary.43 Nonetheless, in 1987, the National Institutes of
Health Director, James B. Wyngaarden, sought approval for fetal tissue
transplantation research from the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS).44 The Assistant Secretary of the DHHS opted to convene a panel of
"medical researchers, lawyers, physicians, clergy, and ethicists," to decide
whether this type of research should be funded, and, if so, what guidelines were
appropriate. 45 Although the majority of the panel determined that the research
was acceptable, the minority, opposed to abortion for any reason, argued
against allowing federal funding for fetal tissue transplantation. 46
In November 1989, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of the DHHS, Louis
T. Sullivan, adopted the view of the minority of the panel and upheld the ban
on federal funding for fetal tissue transplantation. 47 The Bush Administration
then decided to create a fetal tissue bank, whose source of tissue would be that
48
obtained solely from ectopic pregnancies and miscarriages. Under pressure
from the Bush Administration, the NIH inflated its statistics so that it would
appear that as many as 2000 fetuses per year could be obtained from ectopic
pregnancies and miscarriages, obviating the need to seek tissue from elective
42

Nikki M.C. Bell, Regulating Transfer and Use of Fetal Tissue in Transplantation

Procedures: The Ethical Dimnesions, 20 AM.J.L. & MED. 277, at 278 (1994).
43Prior to 1987, all fetal research was governed by Federal Regulation 45 C.F.R. pt.
46 (1989), Department of Health and Human Services, Protection of Human Subjects,
which was adopted in 1975. Chrysso B. Sarkos, The Fetal Tissue Debatein the United States:
Where is King Solomon When You Need Him?, 7 J. L. & POL. 379, 398 (1991). According to
these regulations, research involving the dead fetus and fetal tissue was to be governed
by "theUniform AnatomicalGift Act, local laws, and 'commonly held conventions about
respect for the dead." Id., (quoting, The National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Report and Recommendations:
Research on the Fetus, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33.530, at 75). Although approval of the
Ethical Advisory Board (EAB) was required for certain types of research that the EAB
determined were controversial, fetal research on dead fetuses did not fall into this
category. See Sarkos, supra note 43, at 398. Therefore, no approval was required for
research using a dead fetus. Id., (citing, 45 C.F.R. 46.210(1989)).
44Bell, supra note 42, at 278.
45

Id.

46

Kenneth J. Ryan, Tissue Transplantationfrom Aborted Fetuses, Organ Transplantation
from Anencephalic Infants and Keeping Brain-Dead Pregnant Women Alive Until Fetal
Viability, 65 CAL. L. REV. 683, 688 (1991).
47

1d.

48

1d., see also, N.Y. Times News Service, Fetal Tissue Bank Gets a Partial OK,
INDIANAPOLiS NEws, May 20,1992, CL1.
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abortions. 49 These figures were a significant overestimation, however, given
that fetuses from such pregnancies are typically genetically defective or have
viral infections and thus cannot and, indeed, should not be used for
transplantation purposes.50 More realistic estimates of the useable fetuses from
ectopic pregnancies and miscarriages resulted ina figure of twenty-four fetuses
per year in the US.51 The banks ultimately failed, and lost federal funding in
1993.52
As Ms. Bell points out, in June of 1992, President Bush vetoed H.R. 2507, the
NIH Reauthorization Bill. 53 President Bush's purported purpose for the veto
was "to prevent taxpayer funds from being used for research that many
Americans find morally repugnant... and because of [fetal tissue research
using fetuses from elective abortions] potential for promoting and legitimating
abortion."54 The veto was upheld after a House vote of 271-156. 55 Presumably,
some members of the House had been misled by the inflated figures in the NIH
56
report, believing the fetal tissue bank to be a viable option.
57
After his election in 1992, President Clinton lifted the ban on fetal research.
Thus, until President Clinton lifted the ban, fetal tissue research was "frozen"
for eight years, during which time many people suffered who might have
benefitted from research performed during those eight years.58 Moreover,
49
See Bell, supra note 42, at 279. See also, N.Y. Times News Service, Fetal Tissue Bank
Plan is Faulted: Scientists Say Need is Far Greater Than the Available Supply, BALTIMORE
EVENING SuN, July 27,1992, 1A [hereinafter Plan is Faulted].
50

Garry, supranote 36, at 1593.

51

Plan is Faulted, supra note 49, at 1A.
See Roberts, supra note 17.

52
53

Bell, supra note 42, at 280.

54

1d. (quoting H.R. 2057,102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)).

55

1d. at 279.
1d. at 280.

56
57
8

Bell, supra note 42, at 280.

5 Joan I. Samuelson, a person afflicted with Parkinson's disease, founded an
organization to develop support for lifting the ban on fetal tissue research. The
organization worked with Congress and the public to dispel the myths surrounding the
proposed research, and to document the safeguards which would prevent fetal tissue
research from affecting the decision to abort. Appealing to reporters to "stick to the facts,"
and to avoid the use of campaigns which twist the truth in order to scare and confuse
the public, Ms. Samuelson notes that the NIH Reauthorization Act of 1993 "establishes
the first statutory set of ethical requirements for obtaining tissue from elective abortions
and writes into federal law a set of guidelines by which any scientific research raising
ethical questions can be evaluated." She also mourns the loss of the eight years of
research which might have helped her and countless others:
[E]ight years of research were lost. I have had Parkinson's disease for
exactly that same period, during which I have lost my ability to run,
hike and backpack, watching the symptoms of tremor and stiffness
threaten the many motor functions essential to my ability to earn a
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although only federal funding of fetal tissue research was banned, private
companies, who usually follow federal guidelines whether receiving federal
funding or not, also ceased performing fetal tissue transplantation research. 59
Thus, the ban on federal funding also slowed research in the private sector,
leading one top fetal tissue research company in the United States to
discontinue fetal tissue research altogether. 60 Today, despite President
Clinton's reversal of the ban on federal funding of tissue transplantation
research, the ethical battle between fetal tissue research and anti-abortion
movement continues.
Ill. ETHICAL ISSUES

Currently, if a woman decides to donate the fetal tissue from her elective
abortion, she is not permitted to designate a particular recipient for the tissue
transplant.61 If a woman is permitted to terminate her pregnancy prior to fetal
viability, what ethical consideration should prevent her from designating a
donee for the fetal tissue from the abortion? What moral obligation should
constrain her from intentionally becoming pregnant in order to abort and
provide fetal tissue for transplantation? If the law allows abortion under certain
circumstances, what moral principle should limit the use of tissue from
abortions lawfully performed?

living and care for myself. I see those symptoms creeping up on my
ability to write, speak, and eventually, move at all. As a consequence
of the ban, a scientific breakthrough based on this transplant research
might come to late to rescue me.
Joan I. Samuelson, Scientific Efforts to Help People at Mercy of Inaccurate Reporting, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Nov. 9,1994, Ed.Op. B6.
59 B. J. Spalding, Fetal-Tissue Research: Abortion Politics Slow Advances to a Crawl, 9
BIO/TECHNOLocY 615 (June 1991).
60

Hana Biologic, one of the only U.S. companies to make public its attempts at fetal
tissue research, discontinued all such research, citing technical difficulties and political
pressure as the reasons for making this decision. The company has since merged with
Somatix, which intentionally avoids fetal tissue research altogether. Id.
6142 U.S.C. 289 (1996), follows the NIH guidelines for fetal tissue research. The law
explicitly makes funding of fetal tissue transplantation research legal when the
following criteria are met:
(1) The patient's decision to have an abortion and the decision to donate
fetal tissue are kept strictly separate.
(2) Researchers do not pay women for donating fetal tissue.
(3) Recipients of transplants are told of the source of the tissue, (not the
donor, just the source).
(4) The woman agrees to donate the tissue.
(5) The tissue is not given to a relative of the woman nor to anyone she
specifies.
(6) State law is followed in performing both the abortion and the research.
Roberts, supra note 17, at 46.
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The purported reason for the prohibition against designating a particular
donee is to prevent an increase in abortions.62 However, further analysis of this
regulation is necessary in order to make it clear that this restriction is not a
restraint on a woman's right to do with her body as she wishes; rather, it is a
natural limitation imposed by the prinafacieduties of nonmaleficence towards,
and non-instrumentalization of, another.63 In order to understand this
limitation, it is first necessary to examine the moral issues associated with
abortion.
A. Abortion as Exception to the PrimaFacie Duties
This discussion will begin with a review of the Aristotelian theory of ethical
reasoning and the obligation to honor prima facie duties.64 I will then use
62

Bell, supra note 42, at 282.

63

See, infra § A. Abortion as Exception to the PrimaFade Duties.

64

Sir William David Ross, a Scottish Aristotelian scholar and moral philosopher, was
an intuitionistwho took issuewith "ideal utilitarianism," which "ignores, or at least does
not do full justice to, the highly personal character of duty." A. Stout, William David Ross,
7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 216 (P. Edwards, ed. 1967), (quoting, WILLIAM D. Ross,

THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930), at 22). In describing how Ross distinguishes between
actual duties, and primafacieduties, Stout writes:
Conflict of duties is one of the main problems facing an intuitionist,
who cannot accept the utilitarian's 'Do what will produce the most
good.' Ross says, 'Do whichever act is more of a duty.' To make sense
of 'more of a duty,' he draws a distinction between prima-facie and
actual duties and holds that conflict can only arise between prima-facie
duties. An act is a prima-facie or 'conditional' duty by virtue of being
of a certain kind (for instance, the repaying of a debt) and would be an
actual duty if it were not also of some other morally important kind or
did not conflict with another more important prima-facie duty. Thus,
if I have promised to lend money to a friend in need, I have a primafacie duty to hand over the money. But suppose that before I have
done so, I find that I need it for the legal defense of my son, charged
with a crime of which I believe him innocent. I recognize a conflicting
prima-facie duty to help him. Ross maintains that (a) one, and only
one, of these two prima-facie duties is my actual duty; (b) I know each
of them to be a prima-facie duty -- this is self-evident; (c) I can have only
an opinion about which is 'more ofa duty' and therefore my actual duty.
Id. at 217. (Emphasis added). Thus, pritnafacieduties, by their very nature, are those that
admit of conflict. The statement that a primafacie duty is one that is in conflict with "a
more important prima facie duty," refers to the fact that people differ in what they
consider to be the morally correct thing to do, and this subjective interpretation gives
rise to a personal actual duty. But, as Stout notes, Ross asserts that this "actual duty" is
merely a primafacie duty which, in the actor's opinion, is the "more important" duty,
and so takes precedence over the other.
In the instant study, I present, in two layers, what I believe a re theconflicting duties.
The first conflict is that between the duty of noninstrumentalization and
nonmaleficience towards the fetus, and the woman's right to reproductive autonomy,
and the second is that of the conflict between the duty of noninstrumentalization and
nonmaleficence towards the (now aborted) fetus, and the patient in need of a fetal tissue
transplant.
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casuistic reasoning to show how prima facie duties may sometimes be
overridden in the face of conflicting duties, but that the underlying obligations
continue to inform and survive the resolution of the conflict.
Aristotelian ethics holds that it is impossible for moral understandings to be
based on general abstract principles (universally, invariably, and certainly
known) because particular ethical situations are so variable they defy
generalization. 65 Therefore, "ethics is not and cannot be a science."66 Ethical
thinking must begin from a position of the "virtue of prudence," and requires
application of a "practical wisdom."67 For Aristotle, ethics is a practical, not a
theoretical science.
In his paper, On TransplantingHuman Fetal Tissue: PresumptiveDuties and the
Task of Casuistry, Richard Miller describes the process by which prima facie
68
duties arise, and how they can be overridden by greater, conflicting duties.
Miller accepts prima facie duties as those that "give presumptive weight to
values" arising from an abiding minimum expectation of human behavior.69
They are presumptive duties that are compelling unless a unique situation
arises, demanding a contrary action. 70 Thus, in the absence of exceptional,
extenuating circumstances, we have an obligation to honor these prima facie
duties, that is, primafacieduties are not absolute, but may be abandoned upon
a showing of sufficient proof that a more compelling duty exists.
Significantly, even when aprimafacieduty is overridden, it continues to affect
the subsequent action. 71 For example, the underlying duty not to use others as
a means to an end informs or instructs the conditions and methods of the
subsequent overriding act, resulting in certain criteria which define the moral
limits of the overriding act. 72

65

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, (W. D. Ross trans.) in, (THE BASIC WORKS OF

ARISTOTLE, 935-1126 (Richard McKeon ed., (1941)).
66

ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY, 19 (1988).

67

1d.

68

Richard B. Miller, On TransplantingHuman Fetal Tissue: Presumptive Dutiesand the
Task of Casuistry, 14J. MED. & PHIL. 617,620-21 (1989).
69

1d. at 619.

70

1d. at 620.

71

1d.
To override a primafacieduty, however, is not to abandon it. Such duties
continue to function in the situation or subsequent course of action, leaving
,residual effects' or 'moral traces.' The overridden duty casts a shadow,
affecting our action in pursuit of other duties or values.
Miller, supra note 68, at 620.
72In his paper, Miller lays out, as an example of such criteria, the boundaries inherent
in just-war reasoning. Id.
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Ethicists and scholars have used the theory of prima facie duties in dealing
with a variety of moral dilemmas,73 and the problems surrounding abortion
and fetal tissue transplantation can be addressed by way of comparison to these
earlier analyses. This process of comparison, called casuistry or casuistic
reasoning, is useful in providing a way to analyze new and difficult moral
issues against the backdrop of more familiar areas of ethical reasoning and
accepted moral principles.
B. Casuistry as an Ethical Method
The formal enterprise of casuistry lost theoretical respectability 300 years
ago, when people began to fear that a system wherein morality was decided
on a case-by-case basis would yield a moral relativism, excusing the
inexcusable. 74 At that time, casuists, made up of ethicists, physicians, legal
scholars, and clergy, used their collective experience and education to ponder
the problems of new ethical dilemmas and to discuss them with each other.75
This debate was considered the moral dialogue of the community, the
"knowing together" (con-scientia).76 Under this process
liberty of conscience" never meant the right to take up a personal moral
position that ran in the face of the general agreement of reflective
scholars and doctors: rather, it meant that when the outcome of the
collective debate left room for differences of opinion in marginal or
ambiguous cases, it was for each individual to resolve those residual
ambiguities 7in accordance with the dictates of his or her heart and
convictions. 7
73

See, e.g., James F. Childress, Just War Criteria, in WAR OR PEACE? THE SEARCH FOR

NEW ANSWERS, (Thomas J.Shannon, ed., 1980).
74

JONsEN & TOULMIN, supra note 66, at 11.

75

See generally, id. at 16-20.

76

1d. at 335.

77

1d. The relegation of the issue of abortion to the legal realm produces precisely the
opposite result from that which "con-scientia" would prescribe. The "con-scientia"
process would hold that abortion is one of those situations with such widespread
difference of opinion that no "general agreement" will ever be reached, and therefore
that the individual should be allowed to decide what to do without reference to any
dictates of the law. The law should control only those issues where a general agreement
may be reached. Otherwise, we risk imposing the opinion of the majority on the
individual whose differing opinion is just as valid as the majority's, but in opposition
to it. The ambiguity of the abortion issue simply does not lend itself to resolution via
the courts, because rather than a general agreement having been reached, there exists
only a set of conflicting moral positions, each equally valid. Given such an ambiguous
situation, the only option is to allow the decision to be an individual choice, decided
completely outside the dictates of the law.
The fact that the law currently allows an individual women to decide whether or
not to abort a nonviablefetus is incidental. If her choice is made within the limits defined
by the majority, it is not her choice. If abortion rights depend upon the changing will of
the majority as expressed in provisional laws, one of the opposing, equally valid views
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Although the process of casuistry was abused in the past, it has since
reemerged, 78and is increasingly relied upon by people in marginal and
ambiguous situations where pat solutions, universal standards, and general
theories seem vague and somewhat beside the point. Rather, moral problems
require a fair balance between opposing issues in ways appropriate to the
particular situation. In ethical dilemmas, the might of the majority does not
necessarily or inevitably impose the right resolution.
In the context of abortion, people who argue for an unqualified "liberty of
conscience" or "right to choose" claim that every pregnancy carries identical
ambiguous or marginal difficulties, and that therefore every woman should be
allowed in all cases to have the right to decide in individual ways.79 But
becoming pregnant intending to abort in order to donate fetal tissue is quite
different than becoming pregnant unexpectedly or inadvertently. The
problems involved in a "pregnancy situation" where a woman intentionally
becomes pregnant in order to abort are much clearer than the issues in a
"pregnancy situation" wherein the pregnancy is unintended and unwanted. In
sum, it is easier to arrive at a consensus as to why a woman should not
intentionally become pregnant in order to abort, than it is to decide whether a
woman should have the right to terminate an accidental, unwanted pregnancy.
In the former case, we begin with a situation where competing rights do not
yet exist, whereas in the latter case, the situation of conflicting rights is ripe,
and so demands a solution in the face of an extremely ambiguous situation. It
is this ambiguous situation, that of an unwanted pregnancy, where we squarely
face the conflict between a woman's right to reproductive autonomy and a

must be denied. Once the issue of abortion becomes a legal one, the majority is allowed
to dictate and control a highly ambiguous situation, and the "con-scientia" model would
hold that this is ethically invalid. The law has no place here.
78
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supranote 65, at 304. In The Abuse ofCasuistry,Jonsen notes that
casuistrygained an unfavorable reputation because itwas thoughtto breed moral laxity.
Id. at 231-249. Jonsen writes:
Itihe casuists were professed and dedicated Christians ... [who]
acknowledged the moral dimensions of Christian faith .... Still,
as the casuists pursued their analysis of the moral life into more and
more detailed cases, they seemed to move further and further away
from the clear light of those beliefs. Each series of cases began with
a strong affirmation of Christian ideals; but as the cases became
more complex, the loftiness and rigor of those ideals faded into the
background.
Id. at 238. The casuists were thought to be too ready to excuse those who did not deserve
tobe excused, (particularly the wealthy wrongdoers), and reading an individual casuist
opinion out of context might easily lead to this impression. However, Jonsen notes that
"effective casuistry depends precisely on 'what precedes and follows.' Casuistical
arguments comprise chains of cases arranged in order of increasing complexity. If a
particular opinion is broken out of these original chains, it can be exposed to criticism
or ridicule; but its full moral relevance is apparent only when it is replaced and viewed
within those chains of cases." Id. at 245.
79

JONSEN & TouLMIN, supra note 66, at 335.
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fetus's right to life. This is where there is "room for differences of opinion," and
this is where it is time "for each individual to resolve those residual ambiguities
in accordance with the dictates of his or her heart and convictions."80 On the
other hand, the situation of an intentional pregnancy with the intent to abort
allows less room for differences of opinion, given the powers of both the prima
facie duty of nonmaleficence and the duty not to use others as a means to an
end. But while the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 81 an example of a current-day institute

80

1d. In addressing the consequences that follow from the various possible moral
judgments concerning abortion, Jonsen, et al., note:
No one, surely, can doubt that in the best of all worlds there would be
no occasion for abortion to be considered, et alone performed .... But
as always, this is only one of a dozen distinct consequential questions.
In the cure of souls, as well as personal charity, we know that sometimes the decision for an abortion is, at the very worst, deeply regrettable
but understandable-- certainly not unforgivable, to say nothing of damnable.
Id. at 337.
These authors also suggest that making abortion a crime raises
profound questions of jurisprudence and public policy about the extent
to which, and the conditions on which, good purposes are served by
bringing the judicial processes of the State to bear on the most painful
and personal aspects of the lives of the citizens. In deciding such
matters, points of pure principle make great slogans; but the demands
of personal discernment and the practice of the confessional place upon
us other more serious moral demands...
Id. at 337.
In a recent article from the New England Journal of Medicine, the authors note
that:
Because politics as currently practiced seems so unprincipled, there have
been sporadic attempts to redefine abortion-related issues as ethical
questions and to set up national panels and advisory groups to examine
various practices and make recommendations about their ethics. When
the subjects studied by the panels have been unrelated to abortion, the
panels have often helped to forge a consensus. But when abortion has
dominated the agenda, virtually no progress has been made.
GeorgeJ. Annas, et al., Sounding Board: The PoliticsofHuman-Embryo Research - Avoiding
Ethical Gridlock, 334 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1329 (1996). It is precisely this difficulty in reaching
a consensus on the issue of abortion that necessitates that the issue be a personal and
not a group decision.
81
1n 1974, Congress enacted legislation to create the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. JONSEN &
TOULMIN, supra note 66, at 16; see also NAT'L COMMIS. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECrS, infra note 106. From 1975 to 1978, the Commission conducted hearings and
published reports and recommendations on a variety of moral issues. JONSEN &
TouLMN, supra note 66, at 16. In discussing the Commission's methods of argument,
Jonsen, (a former member of the Commission) notes:
On a completely general level, it is true, the members of the commission
were able to share certain agreements -- for example, as to the principles
of autonomy, justice, and beneficence. But these shared notions were
too comprehensive and general to underwrite specific moral positions.
The National Commission did issue a statement of general principle,
but it was composed only after the commissioners had worked through
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of casuistry, would decide that a woman should not become pregnant in order
to abort, it does not diminish her right to terminate an accidental or unwanted
pregnancy. The two types of pregnancies are much different, and it is these
differences that qualify the "liberty of conscience."
Casuistry is an alternative to deciding cases based on absolute principles,
and requires a critical but moderated inquiry into the circumstances of each
unique case as it arises. To demonstrate why becoming pregnant with the intent
to abort should not be permitted, it is first necessary to consider justifications
for abortion. Once this is done, it can be shown that such justification, which
is an exception to certain prima facie duties, does not extend to intentional
pregnancies.
C Toward a Moral JustificationforAbortion
One approach to justifying the termination of an unwanted pregnancy is to
draw analogies from the ethical structure of self-defense reasoning. We have a
prima facie duty of nonmaleficence, yet self-defense acknowledges a
justification, with concomitant limitations, for using lethal force against
another person if necessary.82 The presumptive duty of nonmaleficence must
yield in the face of a conflicting duty where generalities fail to address the
unique situation of a physical attack, or, by analogy, an unwanted pregnancy.
As with a physical intrusion, an unwanted pregnancy poses an exceptional
circumstance in which the duty to avoid harming another conflicts with the
duty to protect oneself. The fetus qua fetus is not the attacker; rather, it is the
condition of being undesirably pregnant and the resultant unwanted burdens
of motherhood that pose the threat. Although a pregnancy may not be
life-threatening, carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term is a significant
emotional and physiological burden for a woman, 83 a burden that overrides

their problematic cases casuistically. See The Belmont Report: Ethical
Principlesand Guidelinesfor Protectionof Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research (Washington, D.C., 1978).
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supranote 66, at356. Note that following thecompletion of the work
of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created by statute in 1978, and
completed its work in 1983. BARRY R. FURROW. ETAL., B1OETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND

ETHIcS 400 (1991). These institutional ethics committees were extremely important
because "neither had any actual power to implement their recommendations. Both
viewed their roles as primarily educational, and each became a vehicle for developing
a national consensus on policies that would inevitably be incorporated into law." Id.
Both commissions "remain the most constantly cited sources on every issue they
studied." Id.
82 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTJR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7,650-53

(1986).
83

"The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear." Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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her duty of nonmaleficence toward other human life and allows her to abort
in order to protect herself. 84
D. Constraintson the Right to Abort
Importantly, by overriding theprimafacieduty not to harm other human life,
we do not forsake the duty completely.85 The moral demands of the duty
remain firmly in place, strongly affecting subsequent action, even as the
primary obligation itself is overridden. 86 Whether the overriding action is
self-defense or abortion, the duty of nonmaleficence continues to exert a
subjective pressure on the actor, by requiring that the act invoke "not moral
guilt but at least regret about [possible] suffering and the loss of life that
results."87 This is not to say that the act is morally wrong but to affirm that
suffering has on some level occurred. Preserving feelings of regret, and never
losing sight of the loss, acts as a limitation on the justification for overriding
the presumptive duty of nonmaleficence in cases of both self-defense and
abortion.
The residual traces of the presumptive duty of nonmaleficence exert their
most significant pressure on the objective questions of: (1) when an overriding
action is justifiable; and (2) the type of means appropriate for attaining a
justified action. 88 Thus, the duty not to harm is not abandoned, but continues
to exert both subjective and objective pressure on all decisions made.
E. Applying the Just-War Analogy
In making his argument in favor of fetal tissue transplantation, Richard
Miller draws an analogy from the general ethical framework of just-war
reasoning. 89 I have further extended these criteria to situations of self-defense
and abortion:
(1) Just Cause. The just cause for using lethal force in a situation of war or
self-defense is for the "defense of innocent victims of aggression."90 In the case
of an unwanted pregnancy, it may not appear that there is an aggressor; but
there does exist an extremely deleterious situation from the vantage point of
84
Although the pre-viability fetus has not attained legal personhood, prior attempts
to elucidate the ethics of fetal research indicate that we attribute some value to the
pre-viable fetus, however nebulous the extent of that value may be. See NAT'L COMMIS.
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, infra note 106. Therefore, we afford some

protections to fetal life even though the fetus is not considered to be a person, and these
protections can only be overcome for just cause.
85

Miller, supra note 68, at 620.

86

Id.

87

1d.

88 Id.
89

Miller, supra note 68, at 620.

90

1d.
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the woman that requires resort to lethal force for eradication. Although the
woman might not be an "innocent victim of aggression," presumably she is
facing the unwanted pregnancy unwillingly, through no fault of her own,91 and
is thus no less vulnerable than a person who is being attacked.
(2) Competent Authority. Miller writes that in the situation of just-war, "the
92
representatives of the community must declare war and marshall a defense."
In a situation of self-defense, the legal system has elaborated the conditions
wherein self-defense is appropriate;9"3 it is not an arbitrary decision left to the
whims of the defender. In the abortion situation, a doctor determines fetal
viability in order to assure that a viable human life is not aborted.
(3) Right Intention. An appropriate intention must be present in order to
override a presumptive duty.94 In a situation of just-war, the intent is "to
reestablish the condition of peace and fairness."95 In an abortion situation, the

91
Some might suggest that an unwanted pregnancy is strictly the woman's "fault."
This suggestion ignores the fact that contraceptives are not fail-safe. Further, there may
be any number of reasons for wanting to terminate even an initially planned pregnancy,
none of them trivial to the woman involved. The bottom line is that a woman who is
pregnant and does not want to be, is in no less vulnerable a position than a person being
attacked. There is no way out of her situation other than by way of lethal force; there
are no alternatives to ending the pregnancy except abortion. Suggesting that a woman
carry the pregnancy to term and either keep the child or put it up for adoption is no
answer because these options do not remove her from the threatening situation, being
undesirably pregnant.
While there may be women who are careless in their use of contraception, or do
not have adequate education about or access to contraception, the answer to these
problems is not to find fault or place blame, but to educate these women, and to use
societal persuasion, not governmental coercion, to prevent what still must be considered
"accidental" pregnancies.
Further, it makes little sense to try to decrease unwanted pregnancies by restricting
access to abortion. The unwanted pregnancy and subsequent abortion can be analogized
to a automobile accident. Some accidents occur as a result of careless or reckless driving,
some because of poor road conditions or faulty automobiles. Similarly, an unwanted
pregnancy may occur due to recklessness, faulty contraception, or for no apparent
reason. In an attempt to decrease automobile accidents, we regulate the act of driving
with laws prohibiting speeding or driving while intoxicated. Yet we can not attempt to
prohibit the actual wreck, as it is impossible to control "accidents." It is similarly absurd
to attempt to decrease unwanted pregnancies by prohibiting abortion. Once an
unwanted pregnancy has occurred, no amount of regulation can reverse it. Prohibiting
abortion is equivalent to denying the accident victim a chance to seek medical treatment.
And in the same way that allowing an accident victim to seek medical treatment does
not increase the number of automobile accidents, providing pre-viability abortion on
demand does not increase the number of unwanted pregnancies, it merely provides a
safer remedy for an undeniably tragic event that has occurred.
92
1d.
93

See LAFAvE, supra note 82.

94

Miller, supra note 68, at 620-1.

95

1d.
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intent is to reestablish the condition of non-pregnancy, not to harm a living
being for no reason.
(4) Last Resort. This element requires that all peaceful means be exhausted
prior to an act of war or self-defense.% In the context of abortion, there are no
other means by which to terminate the pregnancy except suicide, and this is
obviously no solution.
(5) Reasonable Hope for Success. There must exist a reasonable probability
of success before resort to force can be justified. 97 "Rash or irrational resort to
force is prohibited."98 Abortion satisfies this element in that it is a safe and
effective way to terminate a pregnancy. Additionally, the recently introduced
medical abortions are even less invasive than surgical abortions.
(6) Comparative Justice. In a situation of just-war or self-defense, it is
necessary that neither side have "absolute justice in defense of its cause or
claims."99 Rather, there must exist conflicting claims before resort to force can
be justified. 100 In an abortion situation, there are obviously conflicting claims,
with neither the woman nor the fetus having a clear defense of its claims.
(7) Proportionality. Dangers and risks inherent in an act of war or
self-defense "must not outweigh the prospective benefits" of such acts. 101
Likewise, the risks of abortion, both psychological and physiological, must not
outweigh the benefit of restoring the woman to a non-pregnant status. An
additional risk to be considered is the possibility that abortion may devalue
human life, and cause a loss of respect for certain fetal rights, however
uncertain they may be.
A resort to lethal force can be justified only after the above criteria are
adequately satisfied. 10 2 This "adequacy" must be determined on a case-by-case
basis, and in reliance on the judgment of ethical committees appointed for the
express purpose of addressing these issues.
Once an action is justified, there remains the question of the type of means
permissible to achieve the justified outcome. 103 Here, the prima facie duty of
nonmaleficence continues to exert pressure on the decision, by limiting the way
in
in which a justifiable override of the duty may be carried out. For example, 104
an act of self-defense, deadly force may be used only to meet deadly force.
One is not justified to kill another unless one's own life is in imminent danger.
96

1d. at 621.

97

1d.

98

Miller, supra note 68, at 621.

99

d.

10 0

1d.

I011d.
102

Miller, supra note 68, at 621.

103

Id.

4

10 LAFAVE, supra note 82, at 650-53.
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An abortion may appear to be an exertion of lethal force against non-lethal
force, but, as discussed above, an unwanted pregnancy is typically considered
by any woman to be a potentially life-altering threat. In legal rather than moral
terms, the Supreme Court has determined that a woman's right to bodily
integrity and privacy overrides the duty not to use the fetus (via an abortion)
as a means to an end, i.e., as a means to attaining the condition of
non-pregnancy. The line demarcating permissible and nonpermissible
override of this duty is currently inscribed by the safety of the abortion
procedure, and the presence of fetal viability.10 5 However, these lines have
already begun to elide, as medical technology improves a fetus' chance for
survival outside of the womb prior to the third trimester, and as second and
third trimester abortions become increasingly safer, creating ambiguity and
uncertainty for the future of abortion rights.1 06 Still, at least for the moment,
there is no absolute bar. Under some circumstances, the law does not proscribe
abortion.
F. Concernfor the Interestsof the Fetus
If the fetus is considered to be nothing more than an aggregate of maternal
cells, then fetal tissue research is no more problematic than other research
involving bodily parts or organs.O7 However, according to the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (1975)108 the human fetus is thought to have some worth

105

See, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.

106

1f abortion is criminalized, it is not likely that the actual number of abortions will
decrease. At a national conference held by Planned Parenthood in 1955, the majority of
the participants estimated the annual number of abortions to be between 800,000 and
1,000,000 per year. PATRICIA MILLER, THE WORST OF TiMES 322 (1993). In the 1955 Kinsey
Report on the sexual behavior of the American female, twenty-two percent of all the
married women who responded admitted to having had at least one abortion by age
forty-five, and the average number of abortions over the course of the woman's
reproductive life was two. Id.The averageannual number of abortions since legalization
has been consistently greater than 1,000,000 per year. Id.
Extrapolations from what is known about 19th Century birth rates, illegitimacy,
and 19th Century contraceptive use and its effectiveness, yield estimates equaling
approximately 160,000 abortions in the year 1860. MARVIN OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION INAMERICA 291 (1992). Adjusted for population growth,
this figure is equivalent to the current rate of 1,600,000 abortions per year. Id. at 291-92.
Thus, whether abortion is legal or illegal, the actual rates of abortion are roughly
equivalent. This suggests that a woman who has decided not to carry her pregnancy to
term will not, no matter how difficult it is to terminate her pregnancy. Criminalization
affects only the safety of the abortion procedure, not the number of abortions that are
ultimately performed.
107
Miller, supra note 68, at 618.
108
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
Research was established in 1974, pursuant to Title II of the National Research Act,
Public Law 93-348, to "study the ethical principles underlying biomedical and
behavioral research on human subjects and to make recommendations to the Secretary,
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and therefore should be afforded some type of protection. In a legal system
dominated by adult humans, the only value or worth that a non-adult
humanl 09 will have is that afforded to it by those in control of the system. To

DHEW, and to Congress, for the protection of these subjects." NATL COMMIS. FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Report and
Recommendations: Research on the Fetus (preface), DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-127, (1975)
[hereinafter NAT'L COMMIS. FOR THE PROTECTIONOF HUMAN SUBJECTS)
Whatever a fetus may be, the determination of its value or worth deserves at least
a coherent moral argument in order to "define the moral status of the embryo
convincingly." Annas, supra note 80. In discussing the moral framework as elaborated
by the HumanEmbryo Research Panel of the National Institutes of Health, theseauthors
suggest that the "[ilnability to define the moral status of the embryo convincingly is the
crucial failure of both the panel's report and the overall debate on the subject," and that
such a failure "guaranteed that [the Human Embryo Research Panel's] report would
have no effect".on resolving the ethical dilemmas of human embryonic research. Id. at
1330.
A persuasive moral argument for conducting some research on
human embryos can be made. Such an argument must explicitly
and straightforwardly account for the relationships involved in
human procreation and its social context. An embryo has moral
standing not so much for what it is (at conception or later), but
People have a
because it is the result of procreative activity ....
direct interest in the status and fate of every embryo formed from
their gametes, because such embryos carry their genes and can
potentially become their children. In this respect, the embryo is
not only a symbol; it is real. Similarly, society has a direct interest
in that embryo, since society has an interest in how its members
procreate and how families are created.
Id. at 1330-31. A similar argument can be made with respect to a woman "making fetal
tissue" purely for transplant purposes. Further, "to create embryos solely for research or to sell them, or to use them in toxicity testing - seems morally wrong because it seems
to cheapen the act of procreation and turn embryos into commodities." Likewise,
becoming pregnant with the intent to abort turns the act of procreation into the
equivalent of growing hair to be used in a natural hairpiece, or growing fingernails for
use as press-on nails.
It is society's moral attitude toward procreation and the interests of
those whose gametes are involved in making the embryos that provide
the moral force behind the restriction or prohibition of the manufacture
of embryos for nonprocreative uses. A moral framework that reduces
the matter to an exclusive focus on the intrinsic properties of embryos,
ignoring the interests of those whose gametes make the embryos and
the circumstances under which procreation occurs, cannot persuade,
or even engage, those to whom the creation of embryos solely for
research is morally suspect.
Id. at 1331. The same argument applies to becoming "fetal tissue farms;" it denies fetal
worth by devaluing the procreative process.
109 The category of non-adult humans consists of all living things that are not adult
humans, including children, animals, fetuses, and natural objects such as trees or
wilderness areas, etc. The fact that it is impossible for these entities to voice their interests
does not mean that they have no independent worth beyond that afforded to them by
adult humans, only that this worth is difficult to ascertain in a system that only
understands the language of adult humans. To dismiss the interests of those who cannot
speak is to ignore the possibility that these interests might exist.
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avoid the possible abuse of such control, I presume for the purposes of this
study that the fetus has interests, although these interests may not be directly
ascertainable.
Some have argued that the fetus has no rights because it has no interests. 110
Those who make this argument rely on the fact that because a fetus is not like
us, in that it does not think, speak, or feel the way adult humans do, its interests
cannot be equivalent to ours in value. This is the same reasoning which was
used in the past to deny rights to women and to African Americans.111 Anytime
there is an attempt to confer rights on a new "being," it will sound impossible,
because "until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything
but a thing for the use of 'us' - those who are holding rights at the time."112
G.Denial of Right to Designatea Donee
Assuming a woman's choice to have an abortion is morally sound, we turn
to the question of whether she may designate a donee for the fetal tissue which
results from her abortion. Currently, a woman who has made the decision to

While it is possible that these beings have no interests, and that claiming that they
do might limit the amount of tissue available for transplants, this is merely one factor
to be weighed in the decision of how best to approach the problem of unascertainable
interests. Of equally important consideration is the possibility that these beings have
inexpressible but existent interests, and ignoring this possibility perpetuates the
dysfunctional illusion that we "human adults" are irredeemably separate from other
beings and from our environment, instead of inextricably intertwined with these
elements. In a situation where we may never be able to speak directly to those upon
whom our legal system impacts, the least we can do is to admit that our inability to
understand them does not mean that no interests exist, only that we are unable to know
what these interests are. The limits of our knowledge may be instructive.
110John A. Robertson, Abortion to Obtain Fetal Tissue for Transplant,27 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 1359, 1376 n. 46 (1993)(arguing that 'because the fetus is not yet an entity with
interests or rights, no wrong is done in aborting previable fetuses to get tissue for
transplants"); Bell, supra note 42, at 284 (arguing that the fetus has no interests because
"[ilt has never participated in life as we know it. It has not formed relationships or ever
had anything we could honestly call an experience. Ithasneverexerted its will or formed
expectations."); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 16 (1993)(arguing that a fetus cannot have

interests until ithas the necessary neurological capacity to feel pain: "[ilt
makes no sense
to suppose that something has interests of its own... unless it has, or has had, some
form of consciousness: some mental as well as physical life").
111
See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856)(African Americans were
denied citizenship because they were "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who
had been subjugated by the dominant race"). Additionally, in framing the Constitution,
the founding fathers, conceived by asexual generation, denied personhood to women:
"[tlo the extent that the Framers' intent can fairly be fathomed, their dominant
conceptions denied the humanity and equality of a majority of the American people,
including women, the Native American population and people of color." Sylvia L. Law,
Family, Gender & Sexuality, 26 JuDGEs J. 22, 56 (Summer 1987).
1 12

CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 8 (1974).
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abort cannot donate the tissue from her abortion to a specific recipient.'1 3 This
precludes a woman from deciding to help a particular individual at the same
time that she ends her unwanted pregnancy and also prevents a woman from
becoming pregnant with the explicit intent to donate her fetal tissue to a specific
beneficiary.114 The social concern behind this regulation was the fear that
allowing a woman to designate a donee would increase abortions by: (1)
encouraging a woman to abort a pregnancy she might otherwise have carried
to term; and (2) enabling a woman to "make tissue" for someone she knows
who desperately needed it, by intentionally becoming pregnant and then
aborting the fetus for transplant purposes.1' 5 Although opponents of fetal
tissue transplantation combine these fears into a single concern, the situations
116
are vastly different.
The reasons for a woman's choice to abort are many and varied but
universally, and essentially, personal.
A woman has an abortion because she is unwed, has difficult financial
circumstances, already has a large family that she is trying to raise, is
barely more than a child herself, or for other deeply personal
reasons... . One ethicist who contributed to the Stanford University
Medical Center Committee on Ethics Special Report remarked that
'[i]n light of the deeply personal and powerful physical, emotional,
economic and religious concerns of women considering abortions, it
seems implausible that the knowledge [that her fetus could provide
tissue to a transplant recipient] would have any marked effect [on her

113

See 42 US.C. § 289g-l(b)(C) (1996).

4

11 By keeping the decision to abort and the decision to donate separate, and by
prohibiting the designation of a specific donee, researchers believe the use of the fetal
tissue for transplants will not indicate complicity in elective abortions, any more than
the use of an organ from a murder victim indicates complicity in homicide. John A.
Robertson, The Ethical Acceptability of Fetal Tissue Transplants, 22 TRANSPLANTATION
PROCEEDINCS 1025 (1990).
115

1n Ohio, a woman who learned of the development of fetal tissue transplantations,
and whose husband was afflicted with Parkinson's disease, stated, "if I could become
pregnant and have an abortion to help him I would do it." Marlene Cimons, Fetal Tissue
Research Stirs Debate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1988, Pt.2, at 3 col.1.
116
An analogous situation occurs in the context of embryonic research. In embryonic
research, the tissue source is either the "spare" embryos that are created for procreation
but are not needed, or embryos that are created specifically for research purposes.
Annas,supranote 80. Annas, etal., note that, with respect to embryonic research "many
people, like President Clinton, could approve of research using 'spare' embryos created
by in vitro fertilization without approving of the creating of embryos for that specific
purpose." Id. at 1331. The authors also suggest that had the "Republican dominated
House of Representatives" been provided with adequate information to distinguish
"research on spare embryos from research on embryos created solely for the purpose"
of performing experiments, the failed amendment to permit federal funding to be
granted for research using spare embryos might have passed. Id.
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decision].' Her last concern is likely to be what
117happens to the fetal
tissue, including whether it can help someone.
A woman facing an unwanted pregnancy is unlikely to be swayed in her
decision to abort simply by the prospect of helping another.
The second fear, that a women will become pregnant intentionally in order
to abort, is a different matter and the two situations should not be conflated.
To ensure that the restriction on directed donation is not viewed as a limitation
on a woman's right to abort an unwanted pregnancy, it is important to
distinguish between these two pregnancy situations. One way to make this
distinction is to consider the two pregnancy situations in the context of fetal
tissue transplantation and apply the concept of prima facie duties not to
instrumentalize or harm others.
Such a consideration begins with the assumption that using fetal tissue for
transplantation in order to save another's life is a justifiable reason for
overriding the primafacieduty not to use another as a means to an end. 118 This
assumption is based on the idea that the duty to the health of others overrides
the duty not to use the fetus as a means or not to harm the fetus. 119 This
exception to the primafacie duties continues to be constrained, however, by the
overridden primafacieduties themselves. These duties require that the tissue
not be obtained from intentional pregnancies, because the exception allowing
the use of aborted fetuses for fetal tissue transplantation arises from the
conflicting prima facie duties inherent in the situation of an unwanted
pregnancy, a conflict that is not present in the situation of an intentional

117 Bell, supra note 42, at 289. (Footnotes omitted).
1181 consider the fetus as an "other" for purposes of this discussion.
119
The "use" of a fetus I am referring to here is the use of a fetus from an elective
abortion of an unintended pregnancy, in order to obtain fetal tissue. In weighing the
conflict between the duty to alleviate suffering in those with debilitating diseases, and
the duties neither to instrumentalize nor harm the aborted fetus, I believe that the duty
to alleviate the suffering of the living overrides the duties to the aborted fetus. This belief
is conditional, however, in that the fetus in question mustcome from an elective abortion
of an unintended pregnancy, a situation that I have already attempted to justify, and a
situation beyond which this belief does not extend.
Richard Miller notes that in our society and in many cultures, the dead are treated
with respect '"because a deep personal sentiment is attached to them." Miller, supranote
68, at 623. We honor a person's premortem wishes out of duty not to instrumentalize
the dead. Id. Miller suggests that the primafacie duty not to use the dead as a means to
an end derives from "the presumption against harm, the prima facie duty of
nonmaleficence construed as a bias against suffering." Id. He believes that this
presumption against harm, along with the "concomitant sentiment of regret," enable us
to treat the dead with imputed dignity. Id.; See also, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) 8A U.L.A. 30-60.
It is impossible to ascertain the premortem wishes of the fetus, but combining our
respect for fetal life with our respect of the non-fetal dead creates a presumption of
respectfor the fetal dead. Millersupranote 68, at623. This presumption can be overcome
only by compelling circumstances, such as a need for transplant tissue for a living
person.
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pregnancy. The argument against directed donation thus returns to the
justification for abortion itself.
Abortion is an exception to the primafacie duties not to use others as a means
to an end nor to harm another. This exception is limited, however, in that a
woman may not take a further step and intentionally become pregnant in order
to abort. As discussed above, a woman who becomes accidentally pregnant is
permitted to abort in order to escape a threatening situation, but this "defense"
will be denied to her if she becomes pregnant with the intent to abort, because
she is not facing the same threats that are inherent in an accidental pregnancy.
The primafacie duties not to use others as a means to an end and not to harm
others preclude an extension of the abortion exception beyond the accidental,
unwanted pregnancy.
The woman who intentionally becomes pregnant in order to "make tissue"
can be compared to an initial aggressor in a situation of self-defense. The initial
aggressor is denied the defense of self-defense, having purposefully placed
herself in the threatening situation, and so may not be availed of the exception
to the prima facie duty not to harm others.120 Similarly, a women who
intentionally becomes pregnant is in a different situation than the woman
facing an accidental and unwanted pregnancy. The primafacieduties will bend
far enough to allow the abortion, because it is still an unwanted pregnancy, but
they must operate as a barrier to stop a woman from taking the unjustifiable
step of becoming pregnant intentionally in order to "make tissue." This barrier
does not affect a woman's right to choose to abort an unwanted pregnancy,
which, as discussed above, is a situation that presents an independently
compelling reason to override the duty not to use or harm others, unlike the
situation of an intentional pregnancy.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because elective abortions are the primary source of fetal tissue, moral and
ethical issues surrounding fetal tissue research are inextricably intertwined
with those of the abortion debate. Doctors and researchers have argued that a
transplant from an aborted fetus is morally no different than a transplant from
an accident victim or a homicide victim, and that fetal tissue transplantation
should not become a platform upon which to argue the morality of abortion.
Some opponents of legal abortion agree that fetal tissue transplantation can be
separated from the act of abortion, and that the use of the tissue does not
constitute complicity in the abortion itself.12 1 Despite the initiation of
120

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 3A-3-23(c)(2) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a)(3) (Michie
1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-506(2)(b) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704
(3)(b) (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(c)(2) (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-21(b)(3) (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(d)(3) (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 503.060(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4(I)(b) (1996); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)(b) (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(2)(b) (1985).
121James F. Childress, Deliberationsof the Human Fetal Tissue TransplantationResearch
Panel, in, BIOMEDICAL POL. 215, 221 (Kathi E. Hanna ed., 1991).
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regulations governing fetal tissue transplantation, the process makes us
uneasy, and this discomfort is likely a manifestation of the unsettled debate
concerning fetal worth, the very question at the heart of the abortion issue.
Distinguishing between terminating an unwanted pregnancy and
intentionally becoming pregnant in order to abort is crucial, precisely because
the latter raises fears of instrumentalization that could ultimately jeopardize
the limited right to terminate a pregnancy of any kind. Embracing the
distinction will preclude opponents of abortion rights from claiming that fetal
worth is being ignored for the sake of scientific progress.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the question of fetal tissue donations,
although the status of a woman's right to choose is implicated by the issues
surrounding fetal tissue transplantations. Opponents of this therapy have
voiced concerns ranging from the need to protect the purported rights of the
fetus to fears that women will be coerced into decisions they would otherwise
not confront. Women are portrayed alternatively as murderers and victims,
unworthy and unable to make an informed decision in the face of complexities
involving the decision to donate. However, the regulations prohibiting
designation of a donee were not established because a woman cannot make a
reasoned decision, or in order to limit her reproductive rights. Rather, these
limitations are the legal manifestation of the moral duty not to harm others or
use others as a means to an end.
It is important to accept the choice to abort as an exception to the duties not
to harm or to instrumentalize others and to understand that this exception does
not encompass the choice to become pregnant with an intent to abort. These
are very different situations. Unless the difference is recognized, both types of
abortion will be conflated, and a woman's right to terminate even an unwanted
pregnancy will be lost amidst fears that we are creating "tissue farms." Insisting
upon the distinction between these two types of pregnancy situations, and
limiting the moral exception to include only one, preserves the right to choose
as well as the value of fetuses and of all human life.

